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In many ways, 2004 can be considered as a crucial year for the European Union (EU), with the accession of ten new member states in May, the election of an enlarged European Parliament (EP) in June, and the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty​[1]​ by the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in October. At the same time, the rather limited enthusiasm surrounding the celebrations on the 1st of May and the difficulties encountered before the final approval of the heads of state and government for the new Constitution revealed some potential future problems. Not only will the new and, with the exception of Poland, exclusively small member states have to be fully integrated into the existing structures of the Union, but the integration project as a whole is put to a major test in what is prone to become a lengthy ratification process with an open ending for its new Constitution.
As the ultimate product of what has been termed the "post-Nice process", the latest treaty revision has fallen short of the hopes many ambitious integrationists had linked to it. While the Constitution does not represent the "establishment act" of a new (federal) Union, it still comprises some considerable changes, including remarkable institutional novelties, such as the creation of a President of the European Council. These new institutional arrangements - once they will have come into force -, the proliferation of small member states and the socio-economic diversification that this brings about, as well as the novel co-existence of a liberal-conservative Commission and a Parliament dominated by liberal-con​servative groups, set the stage for major alterations in the future functioning of the policy-making procedures within the Union.
One of the central points raised on each of the past treaty revisions concerned their potential implications for the "inter-institutional balance" within the EU political system. For decades, the ever-recurrent divide between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism played a prominent role in the assessment of treaty changes. This terminology proved to be very efficient in enabling a better understanding of the traditional "balancing act"​[2]​ the EU had to perform between the representation of national or territorial interests, on the one hand, and "European" or functional interests on the other. Generally spoken, intergovernmentalists believe that the European Union is best conceived as a union of sovereign states, whereas supranationalists hold that only a high degree of autonomy of the European institutions and shared responsibility of all actors involved in the integration process guarantees an efficient and legitimate functioning of the Union. Many of them see a federal-like structure as the most desirable endpoint of the EU's evolution.
This type of ready-to-use interpretation has been contested for two reasons: With each reform process, treaty revision has become a more complex and thus laborious exercise, due to the growing number of actors and issues involved, and the difficulties arising from this in finding sufficient compromises. Hence, the solutions found were never easy classify. At the same time, treaty reform must be regarded as a "continuous" and cumulative process​[3]​, which reached its latest peak in the post-Nice process. It is thus insufficient to assess modifications to the institutional architecture (the "polity") of the EU without also considering changes in day-to-day politics when the new rules have to be implemented.
In previous treaty reforms, changes to the institutional architecture of the EU had often been beneficial to the European Parliament, which gained considerable legislative rights in the course of a relatively short period of time. Analysts claim that this extension of the Parliament’s rights often represented a reaction to substantial transfers of sovereignty from the national to the supranational level, as a means of compensating for the identified legitimacy deficits resulting from these transfers.​[4]​ The consequence was - in many cases - a strengthening of the role of the Parliament in day-to-day politics, and thus an ambitious legislative agenda driven forward by cooperative efforts of the Commission and the EP.
By convening a Convention on the Future of Europe, the range of actors involved in treaty reform was largely extended, to the point that the work this body conducted resembled in many ways that of a parliamentary assembly. In drafting a Constitution, the Convention exceeded its original task of preparing the following Intergovernmental Conference. The long and often painful process of elaborating a compromise that would fit all participants´ preferences proved to be a major challenge, as the rifts were numerous: between old and new, small and big member states, integrationists and intergovernmentalists, and ideological right-left cleavages.
While the changes that the Constitution will bring about seem once again favorable for the EP - considering for instance the fact that the EP will be able to elect the President of the Commission, that the new law-making procedure has been extended to further areas and that it will have more influence on the agriculture budget - serious concerns have been raised if these improvements do not come at too high a price for the supranational institutions. As vigilant participants of the Convention, like the Belgium Foreign Minister and longtime MEP Karel de Gucht, already pointed out during the ongoing deliberation process that what might seem like a strengthening of the Community method could in fact turn out to weaken the Commission, and hence, very probably, the EP. Even before the new mode of electing the Commission President was decided, De Gucht touched on the question of whether the "symbolic legitimacy" associated with it could also be interpreted as reducing the powers of this body in the long run.​[5]​ He identified a trade-off between this institutional innovation and the creation of a President of the European Council, in his view a post that could really become a symbol of the EU. With other changes, this "intergovernmental coup d´état" could sustainably damage the role of the Commission and the legislative efforts of the EP would also fade away in many domains. Similarly to de Gucht's concerns, EU scholars have also been drawing attention to the fact that the Commission might lose some of its potential.​[6]​ Some even ask if we must expect "the end of the Community method."​[7]​
This brief overview of what we see, potentially, as one of the main problems concerning the anticipated coming into force of the new Constitution provides the framework for the following analysis: the new constitutional arrangements seem to provide for a veritable shift from the "legislative" to the "executive" or, in other terms, from "low politics" to "high politics". In addition, the socio-economic and geographical transformations of the EU over the past years will have a further impact on the level of ambition prevalent in European policy-making, especially in the macroeconomic and redistributive areas. Against this background, will we witness a trend of re-nationalization? Or will the "Parliamentarization" path advocated by Joschka Fischer in 2000 prevail? More generally, will the changes in the polity of the Union provide for more supranational or rather for more intergovernmental policy management?




By examining at the same time the role and impact of institutions on the European polity and of the internal socio-economic situation of the member states on their policy-making preferences, large parts of this paper draw on the insights of both institutionalist​[8]​ and liberal intergovernmentalist approaches.​[9]​
2.1.	Choice of instruments
European politics as well as academic work on European integration have been deeply impregnated by the dualism between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, which has often taken the form of a normative antagonism getting in the way of positive analysis. Hence both academics and practitioners have repeatedly tried to avoid simplifying polarization by establishing and describing a continuum each point of which corresponds to a particular set of institutions and power relations. For one, Sir John Kerr, secretary-general of the Convention on the Future of Europe and former head of British diplomacy, is said to adhere to the view that the dichotomy between supranationalism and communitarisation, on the one hand, and intergovernmentalism and national sovereignty, on the other, are figments of the past which are not helpful to describe and build the new Europe. On the other hand, the two extremities of the spectrum of power allocations, even more their commonly known labels, still play an enormous role in the politics of European constitution building, not least in the debates preparing the referenda on the treaty establishing a European constitution. To this day, they are among the most often used arguments for drawing voters to one side of the fence or the other.​[10]​
This paper attempts to make use of the instruments offered by liberal intergovernmentalism and historical institutionalism to interpret some of the institutional novelties agreed by the Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) because we think that each approach has its particular field of application. While intergovernmentalism goes far to explain the bargaining background of the “constitutional moments” of the EU’s history, institutionalism contributes most to the analysis of the day-to-day evolution of European policy-making and the inter-institutional balance, for the simple reason that “Treaty rules regarding the manner in which the Community institutions arrive at their decisions are not at the disposal of the Member States”​[11]​. We use, however, a “light” version of liberal intergovernmentalism because we think that some of the demands it makes on negotiators are unworkable in real life. Hence, due to a lack of understanding of the long-term consequences of certain institutional innovations, sometimes results are accepted or compromises agreed which do not even come close to maximizing negotiators’ individual interests.​[12]​ We realize that our approach is exposed to the N=1 problem: one cannot exclude historical accident as an influence on certain outcomes. The paper will therefore be an idiographic rather than nomothetic exercise.
We define Parliamentarization as the ambition to establish and the gradual evolution towards a system of government at the European level with a strong priority-setting and policy-planning input from the EP, a system that in a way would resemble mutatis mutandis parliamentary democracy in a nation-state. One important condition for such a system is a Commission which is able to pursue its legislative agenda-setting and regulatory powers effectively and which is under political control of the EP. For the moment, such a system has only partially evolved because the interinstitutional relations between the three main European institutions are not determined by political majority or by a clear institutional hierarchy.​[13]​ We are of course cognizant of the fact that, contrary to the way it is often portrayed in the literature, the Council of ministers is a deeply supranational institution which contributes to the Europeanisation of member states’ policies. Still, the outcomes of its decisions are mostly the expression of the lowest common denominator of national interests, even in areas subject to qualified majority. Since the institutional position of the Commission is very dependent of the decision rules prevalent in the (European) Council and the powers and policies attributed to it,​[14]​ the analysis of such institutional changes made in the constitution, including changes concerning the executive or "presidential"​[15]​ side of the institutional triangle, will be an important part of the paper.
2.2.	Institutions and policy-making powers: two analytical dimensions
Two modes of policy-making correspond to the traditional distinction between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Table 1 opposes their core conceptions in an ideal-type manner. The main criterion that distinguishes the supranational "Community method" approach from the "intergovernmental" approach to policy-making is the importance they attribute to the decisive actors in the process: whereas in intergovernmental reasoning, sovereign member states represent the main decision-makers, providing efficiency and democratic legitimacy, in Community method Europe the supranational institutions are considered to be important actors which enjoy autonomy vis-à-vis the member states. In contrast to these ideal-typical models, features of both policy-making modes co-exist in political reality, "rendering the Union a unique amalgam of supranational and intergovernmental elements."​[16]​
The applicability of the old divide between the supranationalist Community method and intergovernmentalism to recent developments of EU integration has been challenged mainly on theoretical grounds. Some analysts claim that it is no longer suitable to assess complex and diverse policy-making processes and procedures on the basis of this dichotomy.​[17]​ Others go even further in saying that the underlying ideological assumptions about the finalité politique represent a significant obstacle for scientific analysis.​[18]​ Whereas for integrationists, the European Union is bound to become a federation, intergovernmentalists hold that it will always represent a mere association of states or - to employ a term coined by Ipsen - a "Zweckverband".​[19]​ Observing the evolution of the EU through each of these lenses - from the point of view of what it should be like - could, thus, represent a significant hindrance to a balanced analysis of the integration process. Alternative theoretical approaches, such as multi-level governance or network analysis, have therefore been brought forward.​[20]​  
When analyzing EU policy-making process(es), some scholars distinguish between legislative and executive powers. Taking the EU for what it is (instead of what it is supposed to be), they analyze systematically what impact changes to the institutional architecture have on the legislative-executive relations in the Union. True enough, the concept of political powers in the EU might yet seem diffuse, as no clear separation, let alone "balance of powers" - in the sense we know from democratic nation-states - has so far emerged between the European institutions. Nevertheless, combining the classical dichotomy of supranational/intergovernmental with this analytical tool provides us with a systematic approach to map treaty modifications along paths that can be relatively clearly delineated for a certain period of time.
Legislative power can formally be defined in a rather simple manner as "the making of EU laws and EU framework laws".​[21]​ More difficulties arise when it comes to accounting for the term executive power. As Craig points out, we "can nonetheless identify a core set of tasks that are commonly undertaken by the executive branch of government."​[22]​ He cites the planning of "the overall priorities and agenda for legislation", the responsibility for foreign affairs and defense, an "important say in the structure and allocation of the budget", and responsibility for the effective implementation of agreed policy initiatives and legislation.
Policy-making in the EU has been based on a multiplicity of legislative and executive procedures.​[23]​ As a general rule, legislative powers can be said to be shared powers: the right of initiative lies with the Commission, the EP and the Council interact as co-legislators. Considerable differences exist, however, in the degree of power: in co-decision, the EP and the Council operate on an equal footing. In other procedures, for instance those applied in non-Community matters, the Council continues to retain full control over legislative powers. 
Executive powers can also be considered as shared powers: even if we do not count the advisory bodies and agencies, "no fewer than three institutions can and do lay claim to exercising executive (...) authority within the EU: the Commission, the Council and the European Council."​[24]​ While the "execution of European decisions remains the prime responsibility of national (...) authorities", over time, according to Crum, "typical pan-European executive tasks arose as well as a need to coordinate the implementation efforts."​[25]​ These tasks have traditionally been fulfilled by the Commission or agencies like Europol. Furthermore, the comitology system allows the Council and Member States to supervise the administrative acts of the Commission. 
Being not formally separated, the relation between the two branches is not completely transparent. Furthermore, each treaty reform has produced changes in their relationship. Still, the distinction between legislative and executive powers serves the purpose of assessing major treaty reforms without being exclusively confined to the ideological traps of traditional integration paradigms. A comparison of the results of this type of analysis to the list of elements established above (table 1) will thus allow us to draw conclusions on the nature of the political dynamics to expect in the future EU: a strengthening of legislative powers, particularly in the socio-economic field, would point to further Parliamentarization, whereas a reinforcement of executive powers probably implies a tendency of re-nationalization.


On every question of construction, carry ourselves back
 to the time when the Constitution was adopted, 
recollect the spirit manifested in the debates,
and instead of trying what meaning may 
be squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, 
conform to the probable one in which it was passed.
Alexis de Tocqueville

3.	The Genesis of the European Constitution
3.1.	Preparation of a key player position: France
Anticipating the European Constitution is certainly not an easy task. However, we can avoid a good deal of speculation by relying on a systematic approach. Our exercise of anticipation will be based on assumptions propagated by historical institutionalism.​[26]​ In the specific case of treaty reform, an analysis of how the new institutional arrangements were brought about can help us understand how they were intended. Hence, a brief, but careful examination of the historical context of the original drafting of the new Constitution can facilitate its interpretation. In order to understand key player positions we have first to consider the evolution of institutional thinking in member state governments.
The median player position under unanimity is often the position that is closest to the one arrived at at the end of a negotiation if a strong incentive to find a compromise exists. With respect to the Convention, it is probably safe to say that the bargaining priorities developed by the French government over a number of years after the ratification of the Amsterdam treaty come very close to the this position.​[27]​ They can be summarized as follows: (1) stronger leadership in the form of a permanent president of the European Council; (2) transformation of the Council and the Commission into a European government through better synchronization of their activities and closer cooperation; (3) creation of a foreign affairs Council, possibly chaired by the President of the European Council; (4) increasing focus of the Commission on its political tasks, administrative responsibilities being delegated to agencies, and political accountability not only to the European Parliament but also to the European Council; (5) right of the European Council to dissolve the European Parliament and election of a certain percentage of MEPs through transnational party lists; (6) extension of enhanced cooperation to the common foreign and security policy; (7) gradual separation of legislative and executive functions, partially through better cooperation between the European and national parliaments; (8) a European “judicial area” with common effective instruments; (9) a simplified revision procedure for non-constitutional provisions of the treaty.​[28]​ This list is interesting in two respects: firstly, it already contains most of the major conflicts to surface during the convention and the IGC; secondly, it shows that about half of these priorities were attained in the negotiations.
According to Gray, convention President Giscard d’Estaing had four objectives at the beginning of the deliberations: a reduction in the number of Commissioners; a strengthened European Council; an increased role for national parliaments; and abolition of the rotating Council Presidency.​[29]​ This rather selective choice from the French catalogue of priorities demonstrates Giscard’s well known bias towards the presidential side of the institutional framework. Again, it is instructive to compare this purported list of personal objectives with the final treaty provisions.
Most preferences of other key players could be easily mapped along different positions along the dimensions constructed by the Quermonne report. Whereas Germany traditionally tended to reinforce the European institutions (Commission and Parliament) and the classical Community method, the UK has been relatively consistent in its preference for loose coordination among member states. However, in both governments, the need fore more (executive?) leadership, if not for a European government, was increasingly perceived, thus creating a common interest with France. In addition, the question of better representation of its population size in the Council had become a "red line" of sorts for Germany.
3.2.	Institutional decisions of the Convention and the IGC
Changes to the institutional architecture of the EU constitute the central points of the new constitutional provisions. Together with a few other topics (e.g. the debate on a reference to the Christian roots of Europe) they figured among the issues that were most controversially debated during the post-Nice process. As a matter of fact, some institutional issues were not ultimately settled until the end of the IGC 2004. While 90 percent of the Convention proposals remained unchanged​[30]​, some important modifications that the heads of state and government made to the draft concerned the institutional architecture of the EU. Two innovations seem to stand out: the Convention created the post of a European Minister for Foreign Affairs, appointed by the European Council by qualified majority with the agreement of the President of the Commission.​[31]​ Responsible for carrying out the Union’s external policy as a whole, he or she will exercise a ‘two-hatted’ role, chairing the Foreign Affairs Council and also serving as Vice-President of the Commission. Secondly, while the European Council is to become a full institution, the revolving presidency will be replaced by a permanent presidency.​[32]​ The "President of the European Council" will be elected by qualified majority of its members for a renewable term of two and a half years. 
Other than that, some important agreements were reached on the functioning of the Council of Ministers.​[33]​ The meetings of special formations of the Council will be split into two parts, one devoted to legislative deliberations (in public), the other one to non-legislative deliberations.​[34]​ The highly controversial question relating to the definition and the sphere of application of qualified majority within the Council was not resolved until the very end of the IGC 2004. As regards its definition, the formula finally adopted is still based on the double majority principle devised by the Convention.​[35]​ The thresholds have however been raised: 55% of the member states including at least 15 states and 65% of the population. When a Commission proposal is not required or when a decision is not adopted on the initiative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the qualified majority required will be enhanced: 72% of the Member States representing at least 65% of the population. Qualified majority voting (QMV) will become the general rule. 
As far as the Commission is concerned, the final agreement provides for one Commissioner per member state until 2014.​[36]​ From then on the body will consist of a number of members corresponding to two thirds of the number of states, chosen on the basis of equal rotation. The political role of the President of the Commission​[37]​, elected by the EP, will be reinforced. 
Concerning the European Parliament, the Convention’s proposals were confirmed by the IGC. Its legislative role will once again be enhanced and it gets important new budgetary powers as well as functions of political control and consultation.​[38]​ It will elect the President of the European Commission on a proposal from the European Council, taking into account the results of the EP elections. It will also approve the Commission as a whole. Some other minor modifications concern the ECJ.​[39]​
3.3.	Negotiation strategies
Ever since the early attempts of treaty revision in the EU, institutional reform has represented a difficult task. This has become especially evident in the development of the specific form of EU arithmetics surrounding the allocation of votes in the Council of Ministers. At the same time, different reform objectives have often been connected. Changes in the threshold of QMV entailed adjustments to the number of representatives in the EP, just to cite one example. Even though this tendency of issue-linkage remains strong, in the following section we would like to concentrate on two of the most fundamental innovations among the institutional changes mentioned, namely on the "trade-off" de Gucht had identified between, on the one hand, the election of the Commission President by the EP and, on the other hand, the creation of a President of the European Council. Secondly, we would like to touch upon the coming about of the European Foreign Minister. How did the Convention "produce" these solutions? 
In our attempt to retrace some of the core debates of the Convention concerning institutional reforms we will take a closer look at the preferences and activities of the key actors involved in the process, i.e. the representatives of the biggest member states (Germany, France, Britain, Italy) and some smaller states (e.g. Benelux), representatives of the supranational institutions (MEPs, Commissioners), and at the role played by the Presidium and its Secretariat during the deliberations. This choice reflects the main contests appearing in the Convention, between large and small states, on the one hand, and intergovernmentalists and integrationists on the other.

The President of the European Council
Even though the Presidium as well as most members of the Convention attempted to keep the institutional topic out of their initial debates,​[40]​ it loomed over the deliberations from the beginning. While government representatives had remained rather silent in the first stages, they revealed to become extremely active when (what they considered to be) the "real" power issues were at stake. In a skillful assault at setting the agenda on these topics, the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Spain, Blair and Aznar, in collaboration with French President Chirac suggested the appointment of a permanent or semi-permanent President of the European Council as early as spring 2002.​[41]​ Three purposes were attached to the creation of a permanent presidency: Enhancing the effectiveness of the work of the European Council, guaranteeing its continuity, and, thirdly, what Peter Hain, the British Minister for Europe, explained like this: Having "someone President Bush would get on the phone to, [his] legitimacy being that [he is] responsible to elected heads of government."​[42]​ This jointly voiced idea - "a meeting of minds"​[43]​ rather than a formal proposal - played an important role in the further debates on institutions in the Convention. It was the notion of a single, powerful president that incited multiple reactions. In their memorandum of June 2002, the Benelux countries, anxious to avoid domination by the larger states, stressed that "any alternative to the present system must respect the principle that the member states are equal."​[44]​
The Convention did not formally tackle the topic of institutional reform until January 2003. Only days before the scheduled debate, a joint Franco-German proposal was tabled, outlining a fairly clear picture of what the two countries imagined the institutional design of the Union to look like.​[45]​ Calling for a stronger role of the Commission and the Community method, it proposed at the same time a permanent Presidency of the European Council, yet with a shorter term of office than suggested by the British government. In retrospective, this document can be said to have been crucial for the further institutional debate within (and also outside of) the Convention. The main reason for this was the unexpected transformation that the German government's position had undergone by joining the camp of those in favor of a permanent presidency. Beforehand, the creation of a permanent president had never been on its agenda.​[46]​ How did this considerable shift from earlier positions come about?
Drafting a joint paper demanded a considerable effort from both the French and the German side. They could only achieve it on the basis of an "agreement not to disagree."​[47]​ The final result resembled, as Jacques Delors rightly remarked, rather to "un compromis par addition qu'une proposition originale, au prix d'un effort d'ailleurs difficile de synthèse."​[48]​ A common analysis holds that this synthesis was only possible because the German government traded in its support for France’s wish to install a permanent chair of the European Council for the acceptance of the French government to have the Commission President elected by the European Parliament. Together with the reinforcement of the role and power of the Commission President, the Germans believed that this deal would strengthen the effectiveness of the two institutions and at the same time promote the legitimacy of the Union as a whole. Furthermore, the German government put a lot of emphasis on the establishment of a "double majority" for votes in the Council of Ministers, according the country with the largest size of population more influence than before.
The proposals came nevertheless as a surprise to many, inciting quite different reactions.​[49]​ They were discussed at length during the plenary session of the Convention on January 20th and 21st, 2003. The debate focused above all on the role of the European Council presidency. A vast majority of the speakers pleaded against the Franco-German initiative, mainly arguing that a potential rivalry between the President of the Commission and the newly to be created post of a President of the Council might damage the coherence of the EU institutional set-up. In spite of the open opposition, Convention President Giscard demonstrated his support for the Franco-German proposals. Although MEP Maij-Weggen had confronted him with numbers exposing the majority/minority relations during the debate - she had counted 64 speakers who were against the proposals, 12 who spoke in favor of it and 15 who had remained undecided​[50]​ -, his conclusions after two days of debate focused to a large extent on the achievements of the European Council​[51]​, unmasking his genuine intentions. This debate left its mark on the Convention. The discussions soon circulated primarily around what - in the meantime - was referred to as the "President of the Union" in the media. As time went by, some smaller member states​[52]​ as well as Commissioners​[53]​ renewed their opposition. Luxembourg Prime Minister Juncker spoke for many when he articulated his criticism: "We don't need a Council president who congratulates the American president on his birthday."​[54]​
The first draft articles on the institutional set-up Giscard proposed in April 2003 revealed that he had not taken too much notice of these criticisms. Consisting mainly of his personal ideas on the EU institutional architecture, inspired largely by the Franco-German proposals, the draft articles had not at all been agreed with the other Presidium members.​[55]​ This initiative illustrated what the final stage of the Convention was to look like. In a real last-minute "hustle", the ideas that had been put forward by the large member states were restated by the President and successively watered down by the majority of Conventionnels that defended rather supranational approaches. On the final days, lengthy negotiations involving Giscard and a few other key players within the Presidium led to a compromise on the institutional set-up.​[56]​ Although these conclusive "bargaining" sessions can hardly be retraced in detail, the ultimate outcome gives a hint at the arduous work that had to be accomplished. The all but coherent final result was largely determined by the method deliberatively chosen by Giscard. 
In his final conclusion on the Convention, Gray claims that the institutional package ultimately adopted "was not really the result of the Convention method", but rather of a joint effort of the three biggest member states, France, Germany and the UK, facilitated by a favorable duo: the President of the Convention, Giscard, and his collaborator Sir Kerr, head of the Convention Secretariat and former British permanent representative.​[57]​ If we put the pieces of the puzzle together, strong proof can be found that the agenda-setting power of Britain, France, and Spain had set the stage early enough to influence the rest of the institutional debate within the Convention, which then focused to a large extent on the proposed "President of the Council". The debate intensified after the Franco-German initiative, which can for some reasons be seen as the decisive event in the institutional reform debate, as it ultimately led to the final adoption of the proposal. When Germany joined the camp of the supporters of a permanent presidency, it assisted in an effort of undermining one important feature of the commonly agreed long-time approach to European integration​[58]​: the attempt to avoid any disequilibrium between smaller and larger states. Until then, institutional reform had followed the guiding principle that no permanent presidency should be established in order not to allow the big member states to appoint a personality in support of their preferences, thus potentially violating the rights of the small countries. The Franco-German proposal broke with this tradition. By agreeing to it, Germany weakened the negotiation positions of the smaller states as well as the supranational institutions. Concerning the institutional debates, the former often found themselves on the defensive. Although holding heterogeneous positions on many other issues, they tried to form coalitions in order to fight back the proposals of the intergovernmental forces. 
The German acceptance of the creation of a permanent presidency of the European Council did not come "for free". It was part of the described deal that included France’s agreement of the election of the Commission President by the EP and of a "double majority" for votes in the Council. This deal, however, was rather beneficial to the ABC coalition. The UK and Spain, which had initially not favored the election of the Commission President, rather easily bowed to this trade-off, counting on a continuing loss of power of the Commission. For his country, Prime Minister Blair proclaimed that the creation of a permanent chair for the European Council "will (...), in practice, shift authority from the Commission to national Governments."​[59]​ France also agreed to it without any problems. The "federation of nation-states" approach French President Chirac propagated actually fit splendidly with the outcome of the institutional reform.​[60]​ This conception included not only the strengthening of the European Council and the Council of Ministers as the "clé de voûte"​[61]​ of the institutional system of the EU, but also the reinforcement of the Community method, and of the supranational institutions.​[62]​ Pursuing these quite different aims, the French were in a position to reach agreements with British representatives on the European Council as well as with the Germans or Dutch​[63]​ when it came to strengthening the Commission. Not free of ambiguities or even "plain contradiction", the hybrid approach found successively more supporters in the Convention​[64]​, among them seemingly the President of the body himself. Furthermore, it had a sufficiently integrative effect, helping to bridge the gap between more integrationist and more intergovernmentalist views. Ably wandering between these two worlds, France appears "[i]n many ways, (...) to have been especially successful at the Convention in achieving many of its key goals."​[65]​ 
In contrast to the British, French and Spanish, the German government has to ask itself - to cite de Gucht once again - if it did not trade in a "symbolic legitimacy" of a potentially weakened Commission President for a Council President that might become the "real symbol of Europe’s Union".​[66]​ Did the German negotiators simply underestimate the possible consequences of their deal with the French? Or did they - in an instance of re-nationalization - really undergo a substantial change from a traditionally (and rhetorically) supranational stance to a more intergovernmental approach, which also included the demand for double majority in order to strengthen its role in supranational law-making within the Council of Ministers?​[67]​

The Minister of Foreign Affairs
Contrary to the creation of a President of the European Council the desire to improve the external representation of the EU had been evoked before the start of the Convention. One of the questions raised in the Laeken declaration asked "How is synergy between the High Representative and the competent Commissioner to be reinforced?"​[68]​ It was restated in the mandate of the Convention Working Group on "External Action"​[69]​, inciting quite different reactions. Despite the fact that the mandate included a number of different issues concerning decision-making or the goals and scope of EU external action, much of the heated discussions of the group​[70]​ was dedicated to the institutional challenge of how the desired "synergy" effects were to be brought about. 
The final report of the group identified four different options, reflecting the cleavage between supranationalists and intergovernmentalists.​[71]​ They differed with regard to the locus of loyalty of the person responsible for foreign policy. A first option proposed the strengthening of the High Representative, a second one the full merger of the two posts into the Commission. As the final report mentioned, for "a considerable number of members this option would represent the most effective solution to overcome the challenge of coherence and consistency in external action. At the same time they noted that it might not be attainable at this stage, as there was no consensus among Member States to turn foreign policy into an exclusive/shared competence."​[72]​ For this reason, the majority of the group finally supported a compromise solution that bridged the gap between the first and the second option. It recommended the exercise of both offices by one person, who could carry the title of "European External Representative". The original idea can be traced back to Commissioner Michel Barnier who explained: "I mean he would be vice-President of the Commission but, unlike his colleagues, he would be accountable to the Council. Europe would finally have a single face and a strong voice for its citizens and for the rest of the world."​[73]​ The fourth option foresaw the creation of the post of a "EU Minister of Foreign Affairs", who would be placed under the direct authority of the President of the European Council and would combine the functions of High Representative and Commissioner.
The slight majority in favor of option three determined the outcome of the further debates on this topic. It was reinforced - once again - by the Franco-German proposals. The compromise solution finally adopted after further controversies​[74]​ strongly resembled the Working Group proposals. 
This example shows an element of institutional reform that had been dealt with at an early stage of the Convention, without too much influence by the Presidium. The result reflects the main cleavages. With "competitive functions embodied in a single person, the Minister, with loyalties to at least three different constituencies (President of the European Council, the Foreign Ministers whom he is to chair and the (...) Commission where he is a Vice President)"​[75]​ will have to be a "schizophrenic workaholic", as Sir John Kerr ironically noted.​[76]​
All in all, this account of the genesis of two of the institutional reforms within the Convention underlines the complex nature of the process. Nevertheless, we derive an approximate idea of how the reforms were brought about, and - more importantly yet - how they were intended by some of the key actors involved in the reform process. The way the negotiations were conducted point to a certain extent to notions of "re-nationalization", as every member state attempted to promote its proper interest before thinking of "European" interests. While the results seem, in conclusion, to resemble in many ways the French idea of a federation of nation states, this evaluation does not yet say much about the effects the new rules will have in practice. The question that remains to be answered is: how will the new institutional structures function in political reality?


Institutional Architecture and Policy-making after the Constitution
3.4.	Assessing the new institutional arrangements 
3.4.1.	Supranational or intergovernmental?
The approach to institutional reform chosen by the Convention (Presidium) revealed three main points: First, despite the importance of leadership or the creation of a European government in preparatory documents, "creating a unified, coherent executive or administrative power was not a very important consideration, perhaps not a consideration at all."​[77]​ While the debate about the pros and cons of a Presidency of the European Council took up a lot of the already limited time frame of the Convention, the final package was not really coherent, neither in properly circumscribing the tasks of this President nor in terms of the creation of a "balance of power" worthy of this appellation. Things did not change with the IGCs. Second, institutional reform represented to a large extent a quest for influence and power. Member states representatives wanted to preserve and promote their countries´ interests through favorable institutional arrangements. Also, the results reflect other tensions within the Convention. The ambiguity of the constitutional provisions leaves space for interpretation. What the Convention and the IGC installed de jure might not completely determine what the institutions will de facto do. 
A number of other reforms do not fit in this pattern. The European Foreign Minister, e.g., constitutes a rather hybrid figure, attached to both the Commission and the Council. The same will apply to the European External Action Service, which is also to be attached to both institutions.​[78]​ As already pointed out, the ambiguity of the reform effort seems to correspond quite well to the concept of a "federation of nation-states", which somehow (unintentionally?) bridges the gap between the two classical approaches to integration. This concept, however, is not a convenient device for analysis of how the interaction between the EU institutions will function once the new Constitution will be in practice. 
In sum, this attempt of classifying the main institutional reforms does not provide us with a sufficiently clear concept of the newly created "institutional balance". In order to transcend this interpretation we would therefore like to turn to our second device for a systematic analysis based on the distinction between legislative and executive powers, taking the catalogue established above as a starting point.

3.4.2.	Executive leadership or stronger legislation?
With the new Constitution, legislative powers will continue to lie with three institutions: the Commission as the initiator, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament. The European Council - as is quite redundantly stated in Article I-21.1 - will not exercise legislative rights. Generally spoken, legislative powers shall remain shared powers. While the field of supranational legislation has been extended​[79]​, important areas not covered by the new "legislative acts" remain. The supranational institutions will remain without real influence in foreign and defense policy, and some important fields within the area of Justice and Home Affairs, including, for instance, criminal law matters.
When examining the allocation of executive powers in the Constitution, on the other hand, we can conclude​[80]​ that (1.) Concerning the planning of the overall priorities and the legislative agenda, the wording of the new Constitution strengthens the role of the European Council to a considerable extent, assigning it to "define the general political directions and priorities thereof" (Art. I-21.1).​[81]​ At the same time, its new "President" will be - legally - in a position to "drive forward" the agenda of the EU (Art. I-22), which in turn implies that this task will have to be shared with the President of the Commission. The Commission as a whole keeps its executive functions in this area (Art. I-26). (2.) As far as the second archetypical task of an executive, the responsibility for foreign affairs and defense, is concerned, this remains largely with the European Council and the Council of Ministers. The former is to determine the main objectives in CFSP and defense matters, while the latter will have to implement the guidelines set out.​[82]​ The newly created Minister for Foreign Affairs will also exercise executive functions, but (s)he will work on the basis of a mandate of the Council (Art. I-28.2). (3.) Responsibility for the effective implementation of agreed policy initiatives and legislation will generally lie with the Council of Ministers and the Commission.
All in all, executive powers will remain shared powers with the Constitution, but the inclusion of new actors involved in the policy-making process is bound to alter the balance between the three institutions exercising executive functions. On paper, the executive role of the European Council has been clearly enhanced, whereas the role of the Commission has remained more or less unchanged. However, the election of its President by the EP, and the reinforcement of his role within the Commission college, point to an overall strengthening of the head of this supranational body. The Council of Ministers, finally, seems to lose some of its executive capacities, resembling in some ways - judging the wording of the Constitution - more to the "executive’s executive" than to a component of the executive that operates on an equal footing with the European Council and the Commission.​[83]​ One new element that stands out is the creation or solidification of three different posts potentially to be occupied by persons who could become the "face" of the Union: the Presidents of the European Council and the Commission, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The all but clear balance that these key actors will have to find in their interrelationship will be decisive with regard to who will be perceived as the "chief executive" by the EU population or other countries.
In summary, this latest institutional reform effort seems less concerned with a general clarification of the legislative-executive relationship or the circumscription of a single locus of executive power than with enhancing the effectiveness of each single institution, leaving the legislative powers mostly unchanged, but creating "executive (...) processes (...) a whole order of magnitude more messy" than they had already been before.​[84]​ The resulting confusion regarding the executive powers comes as no surprise when reconsidering the way the reforms were brought about. The focus of the institutional reforms on the creation of strong "lighthouse" figures as described in the previous section favored - at least on paper - the strengthening of executive powers to the detriment of the legislative.​[85]​ 
This result improves our understanding of the institutional reform outcome: Although the reform is in itself far from coherent, its evaluation on the basis of a "balance of power" perspective at least illustrates that - in comparison to some previous treaty reforms - considerably more emphasis was put on the strengthening of the executive than on the legislative. Assessing the institutional package deal of the post-Nice process solely on the basis of text exegesis tells us, however, only one part of the story. It is the necessary condition for our exercise of "anticipating the Constitution", but insufficient if left by itself. While de jure the new Constitution seems to provide for a stronger executive, it all depends on how the opportunity structures offered by the new provisions will be used by the institutions in practice. Let us therefore turn to some thoughts about the potential impact that the new provisions might de facto have.

3.5.	Constitutional politics, rational self-interest and policy reform
In our attempt to "anticipate the Constitution" we have so far briefly discussed the institutional reform process and assessed its outcome on the basis of the framework lied out at the beginning of this paper. We will now turn to the question of what the inter-institutional balance might look like in practice, i.e. once the Constitution has come into force. Our anticipation will draw on two different reasonings: first of all, we will outline the general political framework, which sets the lines of maneuver for policy-making in the EU now and in the medium term. Since the application of the Constitution will be influenced by a panoply of norms, case law, principles, interpretations, usages and practices, the political preferences of the member state governments as well as the European institutions will be as important as the institutional outcomes discussed above for the anticipation of future developments in the inter-institutional balance. As a matter of fact, the "lines of maneuver" will depend heavily on the willingness of the member state governments to furthermore share their sovereignty. This willingness, in turn, relies on the policy demands that the EU citizens articulate vis-à-vis their respective governments.
For obvious reasons, we cannot analyze separately the political preferences of each member state. This would be a whole research agenda of its own, depending on the policy field. We will therefore proceed in two steps: firstly, we will give a short description of some of the political priorities found at present in important member state governments, which will most probably become the dominant doctrine in the Council in the upcoming future. Secondly, we will present a few observations on the likely future policy agenda of the Commission and the Parliament. Bringing liberal and institutionalist reasoning together, this part of our paper will thus provide answers to the following questions: How will the changing policy preferences of the member states influence the way the EU conducts its policies? And - on the background of the general political framework - in which way will the incentives laid out by the constitutional arrangements be used by the EU institutions?​[86]​
3.5.1.	Functional and symbolic visibility
Jacques Delors, like many others, has repeatedly stressed the importance of the European Union being “visible” for its citizens.​[87]​ By being visible it slowly creates the sentiment of adherence and common destiny which is the foundation for further integration steps. Two forms of visibility can be distinguished: symbolic and functional visibility. Symbolic visibility was at the heart of the constitutionalisation of the Union: the Charter of fundamental rights, declaration No. 23 of the Nice treaty, the Laeken declaration and many of the solemn declarations made by political leaders in the wake of Joschka Fischer’s Humboldt speech of May 2000 all were attempts to bring the Union closer to its citizens. Perhaps the most unfathomable aspect of this evolution is that it ended a 40-year old principle not to address openly the question of finality.​[88]​ Under the Luxembourg compromise it was patently clear that any move to spell out how far one should go with European integration would lead to a complete standstill of European policy-making and, a fortiori, treaty revision. Later on, the Maastricht and Amsterdam IGCs were masterpieces of how to avoid profound questions concerning the political long-term objectives of European integration even though creating a political union as a counterpart of monetary and economic union was part of the official agenda. For a very long time in EU history, “the dynamics of the integration process [were] more important than its destination.”​[89]​
With the advent of constitutional politics the benefits of the former functional sub silentio approach are confirmed in many ways. While there is a plethora of multi-level theories in both legal and political science, most of them evade rather than solve the main problem of any federal system, the resolution of conflicts between norms and the establishment of a hierarchy of provisions. In politics, radical positions that would have been considered unacceptable a few years ago are now part and parcel of the debate.​[90]​ If such academic or political propositions gained more ground the implementation of European legislation would increasingly depend on the political consent of the member governments or national courts.​[91]​ As one author has noted, many 'no-demos' and multi-level theories ironically propose "to limit sovereignty in favor of sovereignty, cut back democratic accountability in order to protect democracy, and undermine the legitimacy of law to conserve the legitimacy of law."​[92]​
As we have seen above, Jacques Delors’ emphasis was on functional visibility, particularly as concerned the display of projects financed by the structural funds. However, there are other aspects of functional visibility. For some time, EU citizens did indeed see increasing practical benefits of Union citizenship: passports were not needed anymore for intra-European travel, with border controls later being completely removed between the Schengen states; pensions and even payments related to unemployment were directly transferred by the authorities to other member states without major problems (except, perhaps, inflated bank charges); environmental EU directives could be instrumentalised to block unpopular road projects; scholars found supplementary sources to finance their research, students discovered new exchange schemes funded by the EU; and reimbursements of medical treatments in other countries could be refused by national health insurances only under quite restrictive circumstances.
With the completion of the single market and its associated legislation, this trend seems to have come to a halt. In recent years, new tangible results are harder to see for EU citizens. On the contrary, there are a number of developments which can possibly impinge in a negative way on their daily life: enlargement puts less qualified jobs at risk or leads to lower salaries in sectors affected by new competition; price differentials in important products such as cars are extremely slow to disappear; in new technologies such as cellular phones, which in theory should be an emblematic instrument to remove obstacles for transnational communication, just as they have made disappear distance related pricing within member states, attractive offers are mostly limited to the national network; as with car prices, the Commission treads slowly and carefully when tackling extravagant roaming charges; and while the Euro’s inflationary effects do not appear in the official statistics they are clearly felt by citizens when spending their disposable income, e.g. in recreational activities.
If new EU policies are enacted, they are not necessarily welcomed by a majority of citizens: small violations of the traffic code will soon be prosecuted across EU borders; a trans-border information system on bank accounts and capital interest payments will soon become effective; sensible public health regimes, such as the recent directive to limit small particle pollution in inner cities, may lead to unpopular measures, e.g. barring car traffic. Finally, long-established “Europeanised” services are faded out: on some international railway lines there exist today different booking and price systems which make it difficult simply to switch trains, something unheard of for decades and comparing unfavorably to the old days of the Trans-Europa-Express (TEE); most postal authorities have now stopped to charge the same price for domestic and EU letters, a policy that had been applied by most member states, and even beyond the EU, since the late 1950s.





At this point in time, the political diversity in the Union is rather marked: whereas three of the larger member states, Germany, Great Britain and Spain, are governed by Social Democrats, France and Italy, for instance, have conservative governments. More heterogeneity comes into play when we add the new and smaller countries to the picture. The resulting divergence of policy preferences not only affects the views on solutions of specific policy problems (e.g. the different approaches to foreign policy, or to transatlantic relations), but also the approach to the integration process as a whole. The diverging views about institutional reform explained above illustrate this point. They furthermore determine the willingness of the states to share their sovereignty. In sum, the political diversity within the EU complicates supranational policy-making and stimulates processes of re-nationalization.

Sociocultural Diversity
If "EU policy-making is a process of mutual learning, resting on mutual trust, in which ideas as well as interests shape the search for consensus"​[96]​, profound changes to its over-all political, but especially to its cultural framework must be considered to have an important impact on the way these learning processes take place. The negotiations of the IGCs 2003 and 2004 have shown that - beyond the political differences - deeply historically rooted cultural perceptions existed, complicating the search for compromise. For instance, the Polish position during the final stages of the negotiations has been interpreted in this way. The fear of a European super-state threatening its only recently acquired independence lead to a hardened stance in order to preserve the thresholds concerning qualified majority voting in the Council established in the Treaty of Nice. As a result of this, the reform process almost collapsed. This behavior is likely to be reproduced in everyday policy-making.
Managing cultural diversity in a federal manner ("unity in diversity") can at this point in time not be considered as a valid option. The development of a common esprit communautaire or solidarity among the different member states will certainly take some time.​[97]​ The current diversity must thus be seen as a potential factor of slowing supranational policy-making down, equally favoring tendencies of re-nationalization in the near future.

Socioeconomic Diversity
The socioeconomic diversity of the Union has obviously increased with the latest enlargement. Integrating the incoming new members demands an enormous management effort, and considerable sums of money would have to be transferred. At the same time, some of the old member states have been undergoing important social and economic transformations, in the course of which they have accumulated high unemployment rates ever since the end of the 1990s. Whereas Germany or France display weak growth rates, other countries like Britain, Ireland or Spain are quite in the opposite situation. These differences in economic development put a strain on the solidarity within the Union. States shave to keep a tighter grip on their money, which clearly shows in the discussions about the new financial perspective. In a joint letter, the six net contributors of the EU wanted the Union’s budget to be capped at 1 per cent of the EU's gross national income (GNI) at the start of the next financial perspective in 2007. They stated that the Union’s budget should be subject to the same "painful consolidation efforts" as their own national budgets.​[98]​
But the heterogeneity of situations also generally leads to a heterogeneity of policy preferences and solutions proposed to resolve the problems faced. Reform discussions within the different countries influence the positions that the governments take at the European level. Together with the overall budgetary problems, social reform discussions in Germany, for instance, have seemingly altered the German government’s attitude towards European integration. While the European Monetary Union was formerly intended as a mechanism to "impose German-style monetary rigor" on the other member states, it reveals to become a problem under the conditions of the current economic malaise.​[99]​ In coalition with France, Germany therefore tries to influence the Euro group to adjust the criteria of the stability pact.​[100]​
The list of examples could be continued. While the EU member states are well aware of the fact that the problems they are facing demand a cooperative effort, they are unwilling to leave the important policy choices to the EU. Hence, mechanisms of flexible integration (e.g. the open method of coordination etc.) are given priority over supranational law-making. This furthermore reveals the leitmotiv of a growing willingness to protect the states’ interests. Since structural changes are long-term processes, this tendency could become stronger in the upcoming years. Problems related to the socioeconomic diversity in the EU could lead to an increase of importance of the European Council, while the Commission will be the target of attempts of various governments to influence its policy choices. It will, however, still be needed to carry out important coordinating functions. 
3.5.3.	Policy preferences of the member states
If we take a general look at the political priorities in most European states today, we find that they can be directly related to the problem of economic growth and job creation. Hence, the dominant policy program on the EU level is the Lisbon agenda which, despite attempts to include social policy and sustainable development aspects, focuses on the improvement of the regulatory environment for business and on policies which can be related to economic growth, such as research or education. However, most policies falling under these headings are predominantly national competences. The constitutional treaty will not change this.​[101]​ 
Fiscal restriction represents a core element of the member states´ strategies of coping with the problems related to growing unemployment rates. The consolidation of national budgets, however, demands a restriction of their contribution to the EU budget. The debates about the financial perspective could also be interpreted as an erosion of solidarity within the Union. As a third recent example of a more "protectionist" stance one can cite the reactions to the services directive presented by former Commissioner Bolkestein or the criticism of the Commission’s REACH proposal (chemical substances risk assessment).​[102]​
Since citizens, for their part, perceive the position taken by their government with respect to important EU dossiers, and to European integration in general, a vicious circle of mutual reinforcement of Eurosceptic attitudes may be established. This might hold especially true for some of the new member states, as the debates on the ratification of the Constitution in countries like Poland or the Czech Republic already suggest. But the examples mentioned also point to the conclusion that some of the old member states once very much in favor of deeper integration have become more skeptical of European politics. The German government, for instance, has recently announced internally to block any EU proposal not in line with its interests until the next federal elections in autumn 2006.​[103]​
Ever since the beginning of the 1990s it can be observed that the application of the classical model of the Community method is not the solution preferred by member states and emphasis on legislation at the European level is reduced.​[104]​ On the other hand, new, more flexible instruments have been introduced, but could not fulfill their promises (such as the Open Method of Coordination, extensively discussed and frequently hailed by academics as a the solution for sensitive policies such as the extension of the working life, flexibility of the employment market, the state's stake in the economy or the tax system).​[105]​ 
It follows that, at both the European and the national level, there is a clear tendency to decrease legislative activism, especially with an ambition of harmonization, to the advantage of deregulation, mutual recognition and “lean government” strategies. One recent phenomenon substantiating this thesis is the increased importance given to regulatory impact assessment (RIA). Until recently a specialty of only a few member states, it has now become a practice destined to be introduced at all levels and by all players participating in European policy-making. While RIA could also be used to clarify environmental or social impacts of planned legislation, the debate on the REACH directive clearly demonstrates that at least for the time being emphasis will be on the costs imposed on firms or governments.
On the other hand, areas belonging to the core of state responsibilities and impinging on citizens’ liberties, such as internal security or immigration, are rapidly communitarised. They include and will continue to require a large number of executive regulation and inter-state cooperation to specify and implement the general legislation in this field. Similar concerns apply to areas in which progress has been declared necessary by citizens, such as foreign and defense policy, even though progress will be much slower there, despite the political emphasis given to CFSP in the constitution and in some ongoing implementing measures.

3.5.4.	 Preferences of the Commission and the European Parliament
Looking at the European institutions, a first observation to make is the concurrent dominance of conservative and liberal parties in both the Commission and the Parliament. 
At the beginning of its term, the Barroso Commission has tried to promote a liberal political program, including an approach to the Lisbon strategy primarily targeted on economic growth, leaving the social and ecological aspects aside.​[106]​ The dominant policy program is the Lisbon agenda which, despite attempts to include social policy and sustainable development aspects, focuses on the improvement of the regulatory environment for business and on policies which can be related to economic growth, such as research or education. However, most policies falling under these headings are predominantly national competences. The constitutional treaty has not changed this.​[107]​ Enlargement has increased pressure on business and citizens to adapt to more low-cost competition, thus further tilting the balance towards liberalization of social and economic policies. Differences between social democratic and conservative governments are relatively small. In any case, the are not easily ordered on a uni-dimensional scale. Policies preferred by the UK Labour Party may be more “to the right” than policies pursued by conservative governments in another member state. It follows that, on both the European and the national level, there is a clear tendency to decrease legislative interventions to the advantage of deregulation and “lean government” strategies. On the other hand, areas belonging to the core of state responsibilities and impinging on citizens’ liberties, such as internal and external security or immigration, are rapidly communitarised. They include and will continue to require a large number of executive regulation and inter-state cooperation to specify and implement the general legislation in this field.
As far as the EP is concerned, it seems quite probable that a certain consensus will develop with the Commission to look carefully at new legislative projects. The need for qualified majorities for certain decisions will continue to force the political groups to cooperate on many issues. However, the considerable share of seats of Eurosceptic groups, which generally are not available for such cooperation, has clearly increased the weight of the smaller groups. In the current political climate, the liberal group will probably profit more from this than the Greens or the independent left. Ambitious legislative efforts seem however to be strictly limited to internal market policies, and will thus - as pointed out above - not include the fields that are presently considered to be the most important ones. 

3.6.	 Policy-making after the Constitution: three scenarios 
These observations on the "state of the Union" with regard to the factors influencing policy-making give us a fairly clear indication of what the future could look like in the medium term. The prognosis seems rather bold: to sum it up, the enlarged EU generally seems to be heading towards less legislative and more executive efforts. 
While the Union tries to enhance its symbolic visibility by equipping itself with a "Constitution", it fails to provide the necessary policies to increase its functional visibility. As a result, support for the integration project diminishes. In quest for sufficient policy solutions, citizens either turn back to their member state governments or lose any expectations of political solutions to their problems. As these governments already encounter difficulties when they have to "sell" unpopular reforms to their voters, further engagement in EU affairs becomes even less explicable. In consequence, the overall attitude of and within the member states towards EU integration becomes more hostile. This effect of a declining willingness to share competences is reinforced by the proliferation of veto-players due to enlargement. Hence, growing socioeconomic, sociocultural and political differences on the EU level incite the member states to opt for policy areas and decision-making mechanisms that allow for a substantial control of the EU policy-making process.
Against this background, we would like to choose three possible scenarios of how the new inter-institutional balance of the EU could function in the future and discuss them in further depth.​[108]​ Drawing on the identified conflict between the two potential "chief executives" of the EU, two of the scenarios include a notion of hierarchy, and the third one sees the European Council and the Commission and their respective presidents work on an equal footing. We can touch relatively briefly on the first two of the suggested scenarios, as they represent tendencies that come close to either one of the extreme positions of the supranational/intergovernmental dichotomy. The underlying idea is that - though institutional novelties are to be introduced with the Constitution - there will be no tabula rasa situation. The future development will build upon the existing foundations.
The third scenario, however, seems to involve a new sort of policy-making dynamics within the EU. It sees the Union at a "critical juncture" - where institutional re-design entails a new mode of governance in practice.​[109]​ 

1.	The first scenario involves elements of hierarchy in a double sense. For one thing, the European Council would become the center of gravity of EU policy-making, to the detriment of the three other institutions. Its president would possess the necessary personal and political resources to emerge as the leading figure of the further integration process. Cooperating closely with the member state governments, this new "homme fort" of EU policy-making would enhance the coherence and continuity of the work of the European Council. For this purpose, he could rely on the current Council of Ministers bureaucracy. While the latter would thus become the "executive’s executive", the Commission and its president would become more and more marginalized in two ways: for one thing, its executive role would be undermined by the European Council and its chair. Moreover, it would also lose its legislative capacities. Its area of maneuver would be limited to the fields of supranational policy-making, and thus to policy areas that have been endowed a decreased priority.
	Secondly, a shift from the "parliamentary path" to a focus on executive tasks would be observable, and thus a strong trend of re-nationalization. The overall weakening of the Commission would entail a weakening of the Community method as a whole, affecting also the legislative powers of the EP and the Council of Ministers. The EP would hardly exercise any control of the policies conducted by the European Council. 
	This implies that the idea of a "Union of states" takes the precedence over the notion of a "Union of peoples". This perspective resembles to a large extent intergovernmentalist views, as it is in line with the hopes and wishes that member states like Britain had attached to the latest institutional reform efforts. On the other hand, it comes closest to scenarios integrationists like the Belgian Foreign Minister de Gucht had warned about during the institutional reform process in the Convention.

2. 	The second scenario comprises quite the opposite. In this perspective, the regenerated Commission President would really be in the driver’s seat. Being elected by the EP - and thus enjoying a greater (albeit indirect) legitimacy, he would be placed higher than the President of the European Council in the internal hierarchy of the EU institutions, possibly leading one day to a single EU President.​[110]​ Based on a strong support of the parliamentary majority, he would possess an ambitious legislative agenda. At the same time, the Commission as a whole would determine the overall EU policy-making processes in accordance with the EP and the Council of Ministers. In close collaboration with the Foreign Minister - at the same time Vice-President of the Commission - and due to his membership in the European Council, the Commission President would even have an important say in EU foreign policy and the setting up of an external action service.
	In this scenario, the Commission would ultimately resemble a European government, exercising executive functions and initiating legislation in order to promote the European general interest. The position of the European Council would actually be weakened by the creation of a permanent Presidency​[111]​, and thus run contrary to the intentions of the ABC proposal. The revival of the Commission would strengthen the Community method. While executive tasks doubtlessly become more important, the parliamentary path could also undergo a reinforcement. This scenario comes obviously closer to a supranationalist reasoning of how the future institutional balance could be arranged.

Though both scenarios represent a reinforcement of existing paths and thus, theoretically, seem possible, in the light of the current overall political framework little seems to point to the realization of either one of them. 
Ad 2: Despite the fact that the Commission President has been strengthened on paper, the question remains how much space of maneuver he will get in reality. In the current political context, in which member state governments try to get a grip on the crucial policy fields, his area of operations will probably be rather limited. With regard to its executive functions, the Commission and its president will probably not be able to impede the loss of competences. Under the new institutional frame, they will surely have to share them with the European Council and the Council of Ministers to a larger extent than before. As far as its legislative role is concerned, a lot will depend on the willingness and ability of the member states acting as co-legislator in the Council of Ministers to find compromise solutions on proposals of the Commission. The diverging views currently held by governments will not create a climate facilitating compromise on European legislation on such contested issues as the Lisbon agenda or the European budget.
Ad 1: At the same time, the diverging political preferences outlined above will not necessarily strengthen the European Council and its president either. If the latter fails in coordinating the views of the various governments, member states might have recourse to the well-tried method of delegating executive tasks to the Commission and its president in order to get the policy solutions wanted. 
In consequence, a lot seems to point to the fact that neither the European Council nor the Commission (or their respective presidents) will manage to take the exclusive political leadership of the Union. The notion of hierarchy inherent in both the intergovernmental and the supranational scenario - making the EU look more like a presidential system, with either the President of the European Council or his counterpart in the Commission become the "President of the Union" - thus has to be dismissed. Neither the institutional provisions of the Constitution nor the probable political climate within the EU in the next years support this idea. Instead, it looks as if the two institutions will need to find a new form of cooperation. In conceptualizing this new type of interaction, we might have to surpass the two existing paths. Let us therefore turn to a third scenario:

3.	This option involves a strengthening of both the Commission and the European Council. The underlying idea is that the discrepancy between the existing institutional structure - with the Commission as the primary executive body - and the strengthening of the European Council that the new arrangements of the Constitution provide for causes a problem that can only be resolved by a cooperative effort of the two institutions, involving their respective heads. This task demands a redefinition of the current institutional balance. According to Lassalle and Levrat, the new bipolar equilibrium to be found would be based on the conviction that the Commission has always represented "la continuité de l´action publique européenne et l´intérêt général européen", and should continue to do so.​[112]​ It disposes of the necessary prestige, administrative capacities and resources even a reinforced European Council cannot do without. While the national governments, regain - via the European Council - the control of decision-making processes by making extended use of mechanisms like the open method or other new modes of governance, the Commission as the prime supranational institution would remain important in order to put these mechanisms into practice. So in fulfilling the executive tasks that enjoy a growing priority in contrast to legislative efforts, the two institutions would be intertwined, forming a "double executive". Their Presidents would have to find a modus vivendi to work on an equal footing. While the President of the Council could concentrate on coordinating the member states´ preferences and on foreign policy issues, the President of the Commission could stick with his traditional tasks. This alliance between the Commission and the Council would entail a weakening of the other EU institutions, the Council of Ministers and the EP. While the former would not only lose its legislative capacities due to the diminished importance given to legislation, but also its role as an executive, the latter could lose influence through the decline of legislation-related Community mechanisms.

Out of the three scenarios presented here (cf. Table 2) this last one seems to be the most in line with the picture drawn of the overall political situation. It comes close to the "federation of nation-states" perspective elaborated earlier. As intended by the French negotiators within the Convention, the locus of executive powers would be two-fold. At the same time, the "parliamentary path" to European government would be abandoned.





Anticipating the future impact on European policy-making of new institutional provisions, yet to be ratified, demanded a two-fold effort: for one thing, our analysis was based on a broader historical background. We delineated how the new institutional arrangements were brought about in order to interpret how they were intended. We then focused on the question of how the "written constitution" could translate into a "living constitution". Secondly, the liberal intergovernmentalist part of our analysis attempted to provide some insights on changing Euro-attitudes at the member government level in order to anticipate what the European Union could look like once its new rules of the game will have been put in place.
We have thus seen that intergovernmentalism offers instruments to analyze this "constitutional moment" in the EU's history, that historical institutionalism explains well the mechanisms of new supranational decision-making and its effects on the balance of powers between the institutions as well as between institutions and member governments, and that even neo-functionalism may capture important aspects of how new policy domains appeared on the EU's agenda, especially in its "pre-constitutional" phase. The distinction between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism (or "consortium model"​[113]​) may have fallen out of favor in European politics but this does not change the reality of political contests, where practical decisions over resources and their allocation are taken almost every day (at this moment, the design of the future European External Action Service is a telling example).
The point of departure for our analysis has been the contribution presented to the convention by Karel De Gucht. Essentially, De Gucht made four critical comments: he identified a loss of legislative clout of the Commission with the expansion of the co-decision procedure, a proposition supported by at least some authors.​[114]​ He warned that election of the Commission President by the EP could be a symbolic achievement entailing a further loss of practical power in the legislative process because the Commission may have less political acceptance among the heads of state.​[115]​ He feared that a double-hatted foreign minister may start a process at the end of which citizens get the impression that all external relations are now intergovernmental. Finally, over-crowding the Commission with commissioners from every member state, at least until 2013, could diminish the operational capacity to make collegial decisions. Our hypothesis has been that Parliamentarization requires an effective and independent Commission. As we can see that most of the decisions De Gucht warned the convention not to make have been adopted by the IGC, prospects for Parliamentarization as defined in this paper are not bright for the medium-term future.
The written Constitution certainly offers inspiration for developments in both the supranational or the loose cooperation direction. Firstly, the “fusion of the treaties, the suppression of the pillars, the generalization of co-decision and QMV in legislative matters, the incorporation of the charter, are important legal and symbolic changes, especially in the light of the resistance to change in these areas during prior IGCs.”​[116]​ Secondly, the political will entailed by the latest enlargement to emphasize less the formal parity of member states and to give more weight to influence based on demography has been implemented in the constitutional text. This could improve decision-making if and when this quasi-majoritarian approach is accepted by the smaller member states and their citizens, a prerequisite for sufficient compliance and ownership of political decisions. It also increases the risk, however, that big member states are tempted to go it alone or to form a “directorate” or executive board. Finally, the high-level political contributions following the Fischer speech of May 2000 and preparing the ideological climate for the convention openly split, for the first time in the Union's history, previously joint objectives, i.e. integration, Parliamentarization and federalization.​[117]​ The German position is of particular interest here: Germany has long favored formal Parliamentarization, while increasingly pursuing the objective of emptying or renationalizing certain integrated policies such as the CAP and reducing the Union's financial resources. Moreover, it apparently lost its preference to attribute new competences to the Commission or even tends to reduce existing ones.​[118]​ Despite the cooperation of both countries in the convention, the French position was diametrically opposed to this in the past (preference for strong redistributive community policies without Parliamentarization at the European level). The constitution seems to have found a common understanding on these issues which is not a very clear avowal of Parliamentarization at the European level.
Our brief analysis of the Convention process also revealed a rather blurred picture of the outcome of its institutional reform ambitions. While the first impression of a trend towards re-nationalization, or at least increasing preference for executive decision-making, seems to hold true the institutional architecture nevertheless remains hybrid. Certainly, some prominent changes, such as the creation of the President of the European Council, the cementation of the second and, in some measure, the third pillar as primarily intergovernmental areas, the reinforcement of the role of national parliaments in the integration process, and the installation of various modes of flexible integration, involve an amplification of the intergovernmental mode of governance. On the other hand, some important supranational features have also been reinforced: a common legislative procedure has been created, the role of the EP was generally enhanced, and co-decision has been extended to further areas - these and other reforms provide for supranational policy-making mode in quite a few new areas.
In an institutionalistic perspective, we see contrasting trends. The Commission’s weight can hardly be said to have increased because co-decision has been further extended and a number of other proposals strengthening its position have been abandoned early on in the convention’s debates (e.g., the Commission will not chair council formations, the number of its members will not be radically reduced and the proposal for a single EU presidency supported predominantly by the Commission never flew). Still, the internal management powers of the Commission President have been enhanced, as has been the role of the Commission in delegated legislation and implementation. As to the Council, the last enlargement numerically increases the difficulties to make decisions, at least until 2009, when the double majority rules of the constitution will bring the decision-making capacity back to the EU-12 situation. The relative power of member states in the Council, at least in statistical terms, will change considerably in favor of the big four, with Germany gaining more weight than the other three taken together.​[119]​ As to the relative weight of the Council compared to the European Council, we find conflicting evidence in the literature, with some authors seeing it diminished by increased interference of the European Council in policy programming and foreign affairs,​[120]​ others expecting an increased weight as the administrative infrastructure of the European Council (which would imply a reduced role for the Commission).​[121]​
The general picture of the scenario outlined in part 4 is that the EU has arrived at a defining moment. Enlargement and the institutional provisions of the Constitution create a new situation that will entail a number of significant changes in the inter-institutional balance. Further enlargements are scheduled and will increase the socio-economic, cultural, and political diversity of the Union even more. Policy-making in the EU will thus have to be partially rethought. The diverging policy preferences of the member states have for the moment resulted in a more coherent and effective coordination by the European Council. At the same time, other decisions – for instance the increase at least of symbolic legitimacy of the Commission President - point to the fact that the member states seem well-aware of the continued importance of the Commission as an executive body. However, the trend toward less ambition in redistributive or harmonizing legislation will seemingly continue, thus diminishing the potential of the EU as a whole to demonstrate that its policies satisfy the rational self-interest of its citizens.
The “presidential” innovations of the constitution can be regarded as emblematic for the entire institutional package deal of the Convention and the IGC. Why is that so? The opposition of the two Presidents illustrates the overall interest of the different parties involved in the reform to either promote the role of the European Council in order to enhance the effectiveness of the EU system or to strengthen the democratic legitimacy - aims that have been the guidelines of the whole institutional reform process. If we consider the constitution to give a presidential gradient to the European political system this could reinforce the impact of current political preferences. In other words, both institutionalist and inter-governmentalist reasoning would arrive at very similar conclusions. While deregulation and liberalization would reduce the need for legislation, particularly but not exclusively in the socio-economic field, an increasing political weight of the European Council and a modified role of the Commission could further strengthen this adjustment. The (indirect) election of the Commission President by the European Parliament may offset this to a certain extent but its effects may be limited to political and budgetary control through the EP rather than legislative activism. However, political control at the European level could perhaps become more forceful, at least informally, with respect to the European Council.​[122]​ Nevertheless, to answer the leading question of this paper, in view of the institutional set-up defined in the constitution the EU will remain a semi-parliamentary or pre-parliamentary political system.​[123]​


Table 1: Community Method vs. Intergovernmental Decision-Making: an Overview

	COMMUNITY METHOD	INTERGOVERNMENTAL DECISION-MAKING
Core Ideas	Shared responsibility - all actors intend to achieve a common good out of diverging individual interests"European institutions enjoy political autonomy and authority"​[124]​ in decision-making procedures	The European Union (EU) represents a "union of states" which bargain to maximise national interestsSovereign member states can withdraw their  consent: European institutions are not independent
Main Actors	Commission: strong role in policy design/executionCouncil, EP: legislation (in co-decision)European Court of Justice (ECJ)	Sovereign member states in the European Council and in the Council of  Ministers decide and execute
Division of Powers(Inter-institutional Arrangement)	Commission has monopoly for initiating legislative proceduresCouncil decides by QMV; amendments of Commission proposals only on the basis of unanimity EP is a full partner in legislative procedure via co-decision States and EU institutions can take cases to the ECJ	Programmatic role for European Council; it usually decides by unanimity (veto power for each state) Commission shares right of initiative with member states  EP can be consulted ECJ has no complete oversight
Effectiveness	Brought forth by involving all actors implied into decision-making process and reducing transaction costs	Maintained through cooperation of  sovereign states that possess a veto position
DemocracticAccountability	Achieved through a system of checks and balances - different actors control each other; EP establishes a direct link to European citizens	Guaranteed through cooperation of sovereign national governments controlled by national parliaments, as the EP is not representative




Table 2: Anticipating  the Impact of the Institutional Arrangements of the new Constitution - Three Potential Scenarios

	1Intergovernmental Scenario	2Supranational Scenario	3“Federation of nation-states” Scenario
Institutional balance	Strong European Council with a powerful President as "chief executive" of the EU;Council of Ministers becomes "executive´s executive";Limited role for the Commission and the EP	Strong executive and legislative role for the Commission; European Council weakened; Council of Ministers and EP remain co-legislators	"Double executive": European Council and Commission, each with a strong PresidentCouncil of Ministers loses executive and legislative capacities;Role of the EP weakened
Predominant mode of governance	Intergovernmental Method	Community Method	New, more flexible modes of governance (Open Method, regulations, etc.)
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